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VII. CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW
A. The Duty to Disclose Financial Projections Under SEC
Rule 10b-5: The Fourth Circuit Holds that Unreliable
Financial Projections Are Not Material
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the Act) to
encourage disclosure of sufficient information for investors to make in-
formed decisions in securities transactions. 2 Section 10(b) of the Act au-
thorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules
proscribing fraudulent practices and prohibiting deception in securities mar-
kets.3 Pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-
5 to regulate fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 4 To prevent fraud by misstatement or selective disclosure
of information, rule lOb-5 mandates full disclosure of material facts in
statements made in connection with securities transactions.5 Courts recognize
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
2. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934), reprinted in 1 FEDEAaL
SEcuRITIEs LAWS LEGISLATrVE HIsTORY 1933-1982 708-31 (1983) (hereinafter LEGISLATrVE HIs-
TORY) (discussing need to supplement internal exchange regulations to protect public interest).
Before Congress passed the Act, the Committee on Banking and Currency compiled a record
of investigations of stock exchange practices showing that excessive speculation accelerated
artificial inflation of securities prices and contributed to the stock market crash of October
1929. LEGISLATrVE HSTORY at 710. Prior to Congress' adoption of the Act, manipulative
practices that were legitimate under stock exchange internal regulations stimulated stock price
increases that resulted in a violent downward fluctuation in stock prices on July 18, 1932. Id.
at 711-12. Because securities trading greatly affected the American economy and internal stock
exchange regulation effectively did not control manipulative practices, the Senate endorsed the
Act to provide government control of the stock exchanges. Id. The report of the Committee
on Banking and Currency noted that secrecy concerning the financial condition of corporations
was a major factor contributing to harmful speculation. Id. at 712. To ensure that investors
have current, accurate information on the value of securities, the Act requires a corporation
to update, through reports filed with the SEC, information on a corporation's financial
condition. Id. at 717-18.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (stating that SEC may prescribe rules and regulations
necessary to protect investors).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC, prohibits untrue
statements and omission of material facts necessary to make a statement not misleading in
light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the statement. Id. In drafting rule lOb-
5(b), the SEC mandated full disclosure of material facts. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LoWa FLs,
SECuRrTiES FRAUD AND COMMODrrIs FRAuD § 2.4 (125) (1979); see Securities Act of 1933, ch.
404, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)) (prohibiting omissions
of material facts in statements made in connection with purchase or sale of any security). By
adopting rule lOb-5, the SEC filled a void in securities laws and regulations that formerly did
not prohibit buyers from engaging in fraudulent practices. I A. BROMBERG & L. LoWNIFELS,
supra, § 2.2 (420).
5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1987) (requiring any statement disclosed in connection
with purchase or sale of any security to include all material facts necessary to make statement
not misleading in light of circumstances prevailing at time of statement); see also Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (discussing relation of rule lOb-5 to
securities laws that have fundamental purpose of encouraging full disclosure); SEC v. Capital
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an implied right of action against persons violating rule lOb-5. 6 In cases
involving omission of material facts, however, courts differ on whether
items of soft information fall within the definition of the term "material
fact" contained in rule lOb-5. 7 Unlike hard information, which a corporation
compiles from a verifiable factual basis, soft information involves subjective
evaluations of a corporation's financial status, such as financial projections
of a corporation's future performance., In Walker v. Action Industries,
Inc.9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a corporation had a duty to disclose internally prepared financial
projections in a tender offer statement and subsequent press release.'0
In Walker, Action Industries, Inc. (Action) placed an issuer tender
offer" on July 16, 1982, to purchase fifteen percent of the outstanding
shares of Action common stock.' 2 To comply with SEC rule 13e-4,13 Action
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating that in enacting statutes concerning
securities trading, Congress intended to substitute philosophy of full disclosure for philosophy
of caveat emptor).
6. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 356-57 (2d
Cir.) (stating that private actions are necessary to enforce securities laws), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953) (stating that party may
bring civil action to enforce § 10 of Act as implemented by rule 10b-5); see also Note, Private
Causes of Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule lOb-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and
Economic Analysis, 100 HAgv. L. Rnv. 1959, 1961 (1987) (stating that courts recognize implied
right of action under rule lOb-5). Courts recognize seven elements of a rule lOb-5 claim: (1)
a duty to the plaintiff; (2) fraud in connection with a purchase or sale of any security; (3)
scienter; (4) materiality; (5) plaintiff as either a purchaser or seller of a security; (6) causation;
and (7) damages. Id. at 1961 n. 12.
7. See infra notes 40-73 and accompanying text (discussing differing approaches of
Sixth, Seventh, and Third Circuits in deciding whether soft information is material).
8. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. Ray.
254, 255 (1972) (listing categories of soft information).
9. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct.
1389 (1987).
10. Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986).
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (defining term "issuer tender offer" as tender offer to
purchase securities that tender offeror previously issued). In Wellman v. Dickinson the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the following seven
elements characterize a tender offer: (1) active and widespread solicitation of a corporation's
shareholders; (2) solicitation of a substantial percentage of a corporation's outstanding shares;
(3) offer at a purchase price representing a substantial premium above market price, (4) offer
at a firm, nonnegotiable price; (5) offer contingent on tender of a minimum number of shares;
(6) offer valid for a limited period of time; and (7) pressure on offerees to tender shares.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
12. Walker, 802 F.2d at 704. In Walker Action set the expiration date of the tender
offer at August 6, 1982. Id. Action offered to purchase Action shares for four dollars per
share of stock. 1d. On the date that Action announced the tender offer, shares of Action
stock traded at three and three-eighths dollars per share of stock. Wall Street J., July 16,
1982, at 31, col. 1.
13. See Walker, 802 F.2d at 704 n. 4 (stating that rule 13e-4 establishes disclosure
requirements for issuer tender offers). Rule 13e-4 requires an issuer of securities who makes
an issuer tender offer to publish or deliver to security holders a statement disclosing certain
information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(d)(1987). The tender offer statement must state the
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sent to Action shareholders a tender offer statement that reported the
company's earnings and losses from fiscal year 1979 to March 27, 1982.14
In section 14B of the tender offer statement, Action reported that although
continuing operations indicated sales increases for the fourth quarter of
Action's 1982 fiscal year, Action expected earnings from continuing oper-
ations to be lower than earnings from the fourth quarter of Action's previous
fiscal year.' 5 At the time that Action made the tender offer, Action routinely
prepared internal reports that contained actual sales and financial projec-
tions.16 Although the internal reports indicated substantial increases in actual
orders and projected sales, Action did not disclose the information contained
in the internal reports.' 7 On August 18, 1982, Action issued a press release
confirming the statements in section 14B of the tender offer statement.'
On September 21, after Action's tender offer expired, Walker sold all of
his Action shares on the market for 5.25 dollars per share of stock. 19 On
October 28 Action issued a press release showing that Action's sales had
increased seventy-five percent. 20 By November 12, the price of Action stock
rose to 15.75 dollars per share of stock.
21
After the value of Action stock dramatically increased, Walker filed
suit against Action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. 22 Walker alleged that by failing to disclose information
following: (1) a termination date for the offer; (2) the issuer's intent to extend the termination
date; (3) specific dates, prior to which and after which, persons who tendered securities may
withdraw securities; (4) exact dates between which the tender offeror may accept securities
from tenderers on a pro rata basis; and (5) information specified in schedule 13E-4. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(d)(1)(i)-(iv) (1987). Schedule 13E-4 requires that the tender offeror disclose the
following: (1) information identifying the security and the issuer; (2) the source and amount
of funds for the purchase of the security; (3) the purpose of the tender offer; (4) any
transactions that the issuer has made in the issued security over the 40 days preceding filing
the schedule 13E-4; (5) any contracts by the issuer that relate to the tender offer; (6) the
names of persons that the tender offeror employs; (7) material financial information; and (8)
other material information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101 (1987).
14. Walker, 802 F.2d at 704. In Walker Action's fiscal year began on June 27 and ended
on June 26. Id.
15. Id. at 704-05. In Walker Action explained that due to lower gross sales margins and
higher operating expenses, earnings from continuing operations would not equal earnings for
the fourth quarter of Action's 1981 fiscal year. Id.
16. Id. In Walker Action's internal financial reports included information concerning
both financial projections and actual sales. Id. The financial projections included work
projections and gross sales forecasts. Id. The work projections recorded actual orders and
marked the orders as either firm or anticipated to reflect the likelihood that the buyer might
cancel. Id. The gross sales forecasts projected monthly and quarterly sales on the basis of the
work projections. Id. Each week, Action also prepared flash sales reports that reported actual
sales for the current week and total sales from the beginning of the month and the beginning
of the quarter. Id.
17. Id. at 705, 709-10.
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from the internal reports in the tender offer statement and the August 18
press release, Action omitted material facts in violation of rule 10b-5. 2 At
trial the district court excluded the tender offer statement from evidence2
and instructed the jury that corporations have no duty to disclose financial
projections. 2 The jury denied Walker relief and Walker, consequently,
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 26 On appeal Walker contended that the trial
court should have instructed the jury that Action had a duty to disclose
the financial projections.2 7 The Fourth Circuit held that Action did not have
a duty to disclose the financial projections in either the tender offer
statement or the press release. 2
In determining whether Action had a duty to disclose the financial
projections, the Fourth Circuit recognized that rule lOb-5 imposed on Action
23. Id. at 705-06. In Walker, in addition to claiming that Action violated rule lOb-5,
Walker alleged that Action's directors breached a fiduciary duty under Pennsylvania law to
stockholders. Id. at 706. Apparently holding that corporate directors owe a-fiduciary duty to
the corporation rather than the shareholders, the district court rejected Walker's theory. Id.
at 711. Although the Fourth Circuit ruled that under Pennsylvania law corporate directors
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, the Fourth Circuit concluded that nondisclosure of the
financial projections did not constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty. Id.
24. See id. at 706 n. 5 (noting that district court's reason for excluding tender offer
statement was unclear).
25. Id. at 704.
26. Id. at 706.
27. Id. at 707. In Walker, Walker argued that the trial court erred in excluding the
tender offer statement from evidence. Id. at 706 n. 5. The Fourth Circuit ruled, however, that
the trial court's exclusion of the tender offer statement from evidence did not prejudice Walker.
Id. The Walker court reasoned that because Walker adequately presented to the jury the claim
that Action had omitted material facts from the August 18 press release, the jury could
consider Walker's claim that Action had violated rule l0b-5. Id. The Walker court reasoned,
further, that because section 14B of the tender offer statement concerned only the fourth
quarter of fiscal 1982, the tender offer statement did not misstate any material facts. Id.
Walker contended, also, that the trial court should have instructed the jury that Action
had a duty to disclose actual sales recorded in the internal financial reports. Id. at 710. The
Fourth Circuit ruled, however, that Walker had waived his right to challenge the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on the actual sales. See id. at 710-11 (stating that Walker failed to
request instruction at trial that Action had duty to disclose actual orders). The Fourth Circuit
did not decide, therefore, whether Action had a duty to disclose the actual sales. Id. The
Walker court noted, also, that the trial court refused the defendant's request to instruct the
jury that Action had no duty to disclose the actual orders. Id. at 711. The Walker court
reasoned, consequently, that the jury could have considered whether Action's failure to disclose
the actual orders was an omission of material facts. Id. The Walker court concluded, therefore,
that failure to instruct the jury that Action had a duty to disclose the actual orders did not
prejudice Walker. Id.
28. Id. In Walker the Fourth Circuit implied that under certain circumstances, a cot-
poration might have a duty to disclose fimancial projections. See id. (stating that Fourth Circuit
does not hold that corporation has no duty to disclose financial projections). The Fourth
Circuit found, however, that the trial court's instruction that a corporation has no duty to
disclose financial projections was harmless error because, under the circumstances of Walker,
Action did not have a duty to disclose the financial projections. Id. at 704. The Fourth Circuit
encouraged voluntary disclosure of projections, however, if the projections were reasonably
certain. Id. at 710.
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
a general duty to disclose all material facts in the August 18 press release. 29
The Fourth Circuit noted that although the SEC permits corporatidns to
disclose soft information, the SEC has not imposed a duty to disclose
financial projections. 0 The Fourth Circuit stated, further, that because
recent changes in SEC regulations represent a transition away from previous
SEC regulations that prohibited disclosure of financial projections, courts
should allow Congress or the SEC to impose a duty to disclose financial
projections." In considering whether Action's financial projections were
material facts, the Walker court found that because Action's financial
projections frequently changed and greatly overestimated actual sales, Ac-
tion's financial projections were unreliable. 2 The Fourth Circuit found,
further, that because the large and frequent fluctuations in the financial
projections virtually would impose upon Action a constant duty to update
previously disclosed information, disclosure of the financial projections was
impractical.33 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that because the
financial projections were unreliable and disclosing the financial projections
was impractical, Action had no duty to disclose the financial projections.
3 4
In holding that Action did not have a duty to disclose the financial
projections, the Walker court implied that the financial projections were,
as a matter of law, not material facts.35 The issue of whether information
is material under rule I0b-5, however, is a mixed question of law and fact.
3 6
The United States Supreme Court has defined a material fact as any fact
that a reasonable investor would consider significant in making an invest-
ment decision. 7 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that disclosure
of some facts might mislead investors.3" Some courts have found, accord-
ingly, that soft information is too uncertain for investors to consider
significant in making investment decisions.39
29. Id. at 706.
30. Id. at 709.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 709-10. In Walker the Fourth Circuit noted that although Action's actual sales
rose 75% by the end of the quarter, the projections estimated that sales would increase 129%
over the previous quarter. Id. The Walker court suggested that if Action had disclosed the
projections, the disparity between the actual and the projected sales might have prompted
litigation alleging that the projections were overly optimistic and misleading. Id. at 710.
33. Id. Regulation S-K, promulgated by the SEC, imposes upon a corporation the duty
fully and promptly to update prior financial projections. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii). In
Walker the Fourth Circuit stated that if Action disclosed the projections, the substantial
difference between the values of one projection and the next projection would require Action
continually to update the information that Action previously had disclosed. Walker v. Action
Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986).
34. Walker, 802 F.2d at 711.
35. Id. at 710 n. 12.
36. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
37. Id. at 449.
38. Id. at 448.
39. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating
that corporations should disclose only projections and asset appraisals that are reasonably
1988]
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In Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.40 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit considered whether asset appraisals and earnings
projections are material facts. 4' In Starkman Mobil Oil Company (Mobil)
made a tender offer to purchase outstanding shares of Marathon Oil
Company's (Marathon) common stock.42 Marathon urged stockholders not
to accept the tender offer and sought a friendly merger partner, or "white
knight," ' 43 to make a higher tender offer. 4 Starkman sold his Marathon
shares on the market one day before a white knight made a tender offer
to purchase shares of Marathon common stock at a price substantially
higher than Starkman received for his Marathon shares. 45 Starkman subse-
quently filed suit and claimed that Marathon had a duty to disclose the
merger negotiations with the white knight in statements that Marathon had
made to the public."6 Starkman claimed, further, that Marathon had a duty
to disclose asset appraisals and earnings projections that Marathon had
disclosed to the white knight.
47
The Starkman court noted that SEC rules gradually have changed to
permit corporations to disclose soft information, provided that a corporation
also discloses the assumptions and hypotheses that form the basis of the
soft information. 48 The Sixth Circuit reasoned, however, that the bulk and
certain); South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1272
(9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to require corporation to disclose subjective asset appraisals); Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing SEC policy
regarding reliability of asset appraisals); see also infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text
(discussing Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.).
40. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985).
41. Starkman v. Marathon Oil. Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 235. In Starkman Mobil offered to purchase 68% of the outstanding shares
of Marathon common stock for $85 per share of stock. Id.
43. See id. at 233 (stating that white knight is prospective merger partner who is willing
to outbid hostile tender offeror).
44. Id. To determine whether the Mobil tender offer in Starkman fairly represented the
per share value of Marathon's physical assets, Marathon instructed John Strong, a Marathon
vice-president, and First Boston, an investment banking firm, to prepare appraisals of Mara-
thon's assets. Id. at 234. The asset appraisals indicated that shares of Marathon stock were
worth $188 to $323 per share of stock. Id. On the basis of these appraisals, Marathon's board
of directors decided that Mobil's offer of $85 per share of stock was inadequate. Id. at 235.
Marathon's board of directors consequently approved a vigorous campaign to dissuade Mar-
athon shareholders from tendering stock to Mobil and simultaneously sought a white knight.
Id. In seeking a white knight, Marathon delivered the asset appraisals, together with five-year
earnings forecasts and cash flow projections, to United States Steel Corporation. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 236.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 239-40 (discussing changes in SEC disclosure rules 14a-9 and 13e-3 and
SEC regulation S-K). In Starkman the Sixth Circuit found that at the time of the merger,
SEC regulations prohibited Marathon from disclosing the asset appraisals. Id. at 240. The
Starkman court also found that until 1982, the SEC had prohibited disclosure of estimates of
oil and gas reserves. Id.; see Securities Act Release No. 6008, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,768, at 81,104 (Dec. 19, 1978) (stating that estimates of oil and gas
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complexity of facts and analysis underlying soft information might confuse
investors. 49 The Sixth Circuit ruled, also, that because the outcome of
ongoing merger negotiations is uncertain, disclosure of possible price and
structure agreements is potentially misleading.50 The Starkman court con-
cluded, therefore, that a corporation has a duty to disclose only projections
and asset appraisals that are substantially certain.
5'
In Flamm v. Eberstad5 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reached a holding in accord with the decision of the
Starkman court.53 The Flamm court, however, rejected the Starkman court's
rationale that disclosure of soft information may mislead investors.54 In
Flamm General Cable Corporation (General Cable) made a tender offer to
purchase shares of Microdot, Incorporated (Microdot).1 Microdot consid-
ered the price that General Cable offered for Microdot shares too low and
advertised that Microdot intended to remain independent.16 Although Mi-
crodot sought a white knight to offer a price for Microdot shares higher
than General Cable's offered price, Microdot failed to disclose the search
for a white knight to shareholders. 57 A Microdot shareholder brought a rule
lOb-5 claim alleging that Microdot's search for a white knight was material
information. 8 Stating that sophisticated investors routinely rely upon un-
certain information to make investment decisions, the Flamm court rejected
the notion that uncertain information may confuse investors. 9 The Seventh
reserves are not reliable and may mislead investors). In 1982, however, the SEC amended
regulation S-K to permit disclosure of oil and gas reserve estimates if a corporation provided
the estimates to a person offering to merge with or acquire the company. Securities Act Release
No. 6383, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328,
at 63,003 (March 3, 1982).
49. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 239.
50. Id. at 243. The Starkman court expressed concern that by disclosing preliminary
merger negotiations, corporations might force a potential tender offeror to abandon a contem-
plated merger. Id. at 243.
51. See id. at 241 (stating that Sixth Circuit precedent fully supported rule that tender
offer target must disclose only projections and asset appraisals that are substantially certain).
52. 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that corporation
has no duty to disclose merger negotiations until merging corporations agree on price and
structure of merger); Starkman, 772 F.2d at 243 (affirming application of price-and-structure
rule to determine corporation's duty to disclose ongoing merger negotiations).
54. Id. at 1175.
55. Id. at 1170-71. In Flamm, when General Cable announced the intention to make a
tender offer for Microdot, Microdot's stock traded at $11.75 per share of stock. Id. at 1171.
General Cable planned to offer $17 per share of stock for Microdot stock. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. In Flamm Microdot authorized Goldman, Sachs & Company, an investment
banking firm, to solicit possible friendly merger partners. Id. Over a six week period, Goldman,
Sachs & Company convinced Northwest Industries to make a tender offer higher than General
Cable's tender offer. Id. Microdot and Northwest Industries, subsequently, completed a merger
in which Northwest Industries purchased Microdot shares at $21 per share of stock. Id.
58. Id. at 1172.
59. Id. at 1175. The lamm court reasoned that courts should not assume that investors
cannot comprehend the risks involved in securities trading. See id. (discussing examples of
uncertain information on which investors routinely rely).
19881
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Circuit reasoned that because the information about Microdot's search for
a white knight communicated the possibility that another corporation might
offer a higher price for shares of Microdot stock than General Cable had
offered, the information was significant to investorsA0 The Seventh Circuit
noted, however, that during a hostile takeover, trading in the target cor-
poration's stock on the basis of rumors that the target is searching for a
white knight may increase the market price of the target corporation's stock
and consequently reduce a tender offeror's incentive to purchase the target
corporation. 6' The Seventh Circuit reasoned, further, that publicly disclosing
merger negotiations further would decrease a white knight's incentive to
purchase the target corporation. 62 The Flamm court concluded that because
disclosure of merger negotiations would interfere with completing contem-
plated mergers, tender offer targets have no duty to disclose merger nego-
tiations until the merging corporations agree on the price and structure of
the merger.
63
In Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. 4 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted an analysis of soft information
that differs from the approaches of both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 65
In Flynn Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. (Bass Brothers) made a tender
offer for all outstanding shares of National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling
Company (National Alfalfa).6 Before announcing the tender offer for
60. Id. at 1174. The Flamm court emphasized that events with uncertain outcomes are
the type of news on which sophisticated investors act. Id. at 1175. The Seventh Circuit stated,
further, that the price of a corporation's stock already reflects the impact of news with settled
value. Id.
61. See id. at 1177 (discussing effect of arbitrage activity upon market price of tender
offer target's stock). The Flamm court stated that because arbitrageurs anticipate that a white
knight will offer to purchase shares of a tender offer target's stock at a price higher than the
stock's market value, arbitrageurs purchase shares of a tender offer target's stock. Id. The
Flamm court reasoned that because arbitrageurs will attempt to outbid each other to obtain
the tender offer target's stock, the market price of the tender offer target's stock will increase
toward the price that arbitrageurs believe that a white knight would offer for shares in the
target corporation. Id.
62. See id. at 1176 (stating that early disclosure of merger negotiations will decrease
price that bidders will offer for target corporation). In Flamm the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that disclosure of ongoing merger negotiations would attract more potential purchasers for the
target corporation. Id. The Flamm court concluded, therefore, that potential tender offerors
initially would respond to the increased competition by offering a lower price for the target
corporation's shares. Id.
63. See id. at 1178 (stating that price-and-structure rule is better than any alternative).
The Flamm court reasoned that investors have an opportunity to sell shares of a tender offer
target's stock at a premium during merger negotiations. See id. at 1176-77 (stating that silence
pending settlement of price and structure of merger benefits most investors); supra note 61
(discussing effect of arbitrage speculation upon price of target corporation's stock).
64. 744 F.2d 978 (3rd Cir. 1984).
65. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 982. In Flynn, before making a tender offer for National Alfalfa stock, Bass
Brothers acquired 52% of the outstanding shares of National Alfalfa's common stock. Id. at
981. Bass Brothers acquired an additional 9.10%6 of National Alfalfa's common stock in a
private sale. Id. at 981-82. When the tender offer expired, Bass Brothers owned over 92% of
National Alfalfa's common stock. Id.
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National Alfalfa common stock, Bass Brothers obtained two appraisals of
National Alfalfa's assets.67 Flynn, a National Alfalfa shareholder who sold
his National Alfalfa shares in response to the Bass Brothers tender offer,
filed suit against Bass Brothers alleging that the asset appraisals were
material facts that Bass Brothers had a duty to disclose in the tender offer
statement.6 8 The Flynn court recognized that although the SEC previously
had prohibited disclosure of much soft information, the SEC subsequently
had amended certain rules and regulations to permit disclosure of soft
information. 69 To give full effect to the recent changes in the SEC regulatory
scheme, the Third Circuit announced a circumstantial test for determining
whether soft information is material under rule lOb-5.7 0 The Flynn court
required courts to determine whether omitted information was material by
considering the following seven factors: (1) the factual basis for the infor-
mation; (2) the qualifications of the persons who prepared the information;
(3) the intended purpose for the information; (4) the relevance of the
information to the stockholder's impending decision; (5) the degree of
subjectivity or bias reflected in the preparation of the information; (6) the
degree to which the information is unique; and (7) the availability to
stockholders of more reliable information.7 ' Because the circumstantial test
reflected current developments in disclosure law, however, the Third Circuit
did not apply the Flynn test retroactively to Bass Brothers.7 2 The Flynn
court concluded, instead, that under disclosure law at the time of the Bass
67. Id. In Flynn Bass Brothers initially became interested in purchasing National Alfalfa
when a third corporation, Prochemco, Inc. (Prochemco), approached Bass Brothers as a
possible source to finance a purchase of National Alfalfa by Prochemco. Id. at 981. Prochemco
had prepared two reports on National Alfalfa that included appraisals of National Alfalfa's
assets. Id. The Prochemco reports estimated National Alfalfa's stock to be worth $16.40 per
share if National Alfalfa continued business, $12.40 per share if a takeover bidder subsequently
liquidated National Alfalfa in an orderly fashion, and $6.40 per share if a takeover bidder
subsequently liquidated National Alfalfa under stress conditions. Id. at 982.
68. Id. at 983.
69..Id. at 987. The Flynn court noted that the SEC previously had prohibited disclosure
of soft information to prevent corporations from misleading purchasers of securities by making
overly optimistic claims. Id. The Flynn court attributed the recent shift in SEC policy to SEC
recognition that investors sometimes may need soft information. Id.; see Notice of Adoption
of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,202 (1976) (stating that, in response to investor
demands, SEC chose to delete earnings projections from list of potentially misleading infor-
mation).
70. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 987 (3d Cir. 1984). In Flynn the
Third Circuit noted that the time lag between an allegedly deficient disclosure and subsequent
appellate review of the disclosure has slowed the evolution of disclosure law. Id. The Flynn
court did not apply the test retroactively to Bass Brothers, however, because many of the
changes in the SEC's regulation of soft information disclosure occurred after the Bass Brothers
tender offer. Id. at 988.
71. Id. The Flynn court compiled factors that other courts have considered in determining
whether soft information is reliable. Id. at 986 & nn. 12-13.
72. Id. at 988.
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Brothers tender offer, Bass Brothers had no duty to disclose the asset
appraisals.
73
In Walker the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt any of the standards
that the other circuits have applied to soft information. 74 Like the Starkman
court, however, the Fourth Circuit in Walker reasoned that uncertain
information potentially may mislead investors by inaccurately portraying a
corporation's future financial prospects .7  The Walker court's distinction
between certain and uncertain information provides a simple analytical
framework for determining whether a corporation has a duty to disclose
the information. 76 By equating uncertainty with unreliability, however, courts
assume that a reasonable shareholder cannot determine the significance of
soft information.7 7 If a corporation discloses the facts and assumptions that
underlie the financial projections, investors may examine the underlying
information to determine whether financial projections are reliable .7 A rule
that limits material information to information that is substantially certain,
therefore, sometimes deprives investors of information that would be sig-
nificant in making an investment decision if disclosed in an appropriate
format.
7 9
Disregarding the Walker court's reasoning that uncertain information
misleads investors, the Seventh Circuit in Flamm stated that courts which
have assumed that probabilistic information confuses investors have under-
estimated investors' ability to comprehend probabilistic information.8 0 The
Flamm rationale recognizes that the significance of ongoing merger nego-
tiations to investors, rather than the uncertain outcome of the negotiations,
73. See id. (stating that Bass Brothers' asset appraisals lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability to require disclosure).
74. Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 n. 11 (4th Cir. 1986).
75. See id. at 709-10 (discussing frequent changes in Action's financial projections and
failure of financial projections to predict actual sales increases); see also supra notes 48-51
and accompanying text (discussing Starkman court's rationale that uncertainty and complexity
of soft information may confuse investors).
76. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that
soft information should be almost as certain as hard facts). By requiring soft information to
be as certain as hard facts, courts practically eliminate soft information from the category of
material information. See Note, Tender Offers-A Hard Look at Soft Information: Disclosure
of Asset Appraisals, Corporate Projections, and other Forward-Looking Information Required
if Material and if Disclosure Would Be More Beneficial than Detrimental to Target Share-
holders, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 511, 521 (1986) (stating that courts which focus on uncertain
nature of soft information generally hold soft information nonmaterial).
77. See Note, supra note 76, at 521 (stating that in holding soft information immaterial,
courts infer that reasonable shareholders attach significance to unreliable information).
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(i) (1987) (stating that disclosure of underlying assump-
tions provides analytical framework and enhances investor understanding); see also supra note
48 and accompanying text (Starkman court recognizing that corporations may disclose soft
information if accompanied by underlying assumptions).
79. See supra notes 59-60 (stating that in making investment decisions, investors consider
probabilistic information); see also supra note 78 (stating that disclosure of underlying as-
sumptions aids investors in determining reliability of probabilistic information).
80. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987).
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mandates deferring disclosure until corporations reach an agreement on the
price and structure of the merger.8' Because the price-and-structure rule
arises in the context of merger negotiations, however, the price-and-structure
rule has no application to issuer tender offers.82 The reasoning of the Flamm
court strongly indicates, nevertheless, that in making investment decisions,
investors routinely assimilate uncertain information .8 By focusing exclusively
on the uncertain nature of financial projections, the Walker analysis ignores
the fact that investors may prefer disclosure of probabilistic information to
the absence of any information. 4
In contrast to the focus of the Walker analysis on the possibility that
uncertain information may mislead investors, the Flynn balancing test directs
courts to evaluate the potential aid that soft information may provide to
investors.8" Instead of examining the difference between predicted and
achieved values, the Flynn test provides criteria for analyzing the reliability
of soft information that focus on the manner and means of preparing the
information.86 By inspecting the facts and assumptions from which a cor-
poration prepared soft information, courts using the Flynn test may deter-
mine whether the information reflects conclusions drawn from reliable facts
and logical assumptions.8 7 By examining the purpose for which a corporation
prepared soft information, courts also may determine whether the infor-
mation is overly optimistic.88 If courts find that the factual basis for soft
81. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing economic effect that investor
reaction to news of merger negotiations has upon price of tender offer target's stock).
82. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing effect of disclosure of
merger negotiations on market value of corporate stock). The price-and-structure rule adopted
by the Flamm court assumes that after corporations agree on the price and structure of a
merger, the likelihood of consummating the merger attains a degree of certainty. See Greenfield
v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3rd Cir. 1984) (stating that agreement to price and
structure terms represents agreement in principle to merge). Contrastingly, definiteness of price
and structure are distinguishing characteristics of a tender offer. See supra note 11 (defining
tender offer).
83. See Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1175 (stating that assuming investors cannot understand
uncertain information implies that corporations should not inform investors of many routine
events).
84. See id. (stating that access to some information is better than access to no infor-
mation).
85. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984).
86. See id.; see also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (describing application of
the Flynn test).
87. See Note, Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offers after Flynn v. Bass
Brothers, Inc., 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 915, 927-28 (1985) (stating that in applying Flynn
test, courts should determine adequacy of underlying facts). By directing courts to determine
whether qualified persons prepared soft information, the Flynn test provides a secondary
means for analyzing the factual basis for soft information. See Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988 (setting
forth Flynn test); Note, supra, at 929-30 (stating that second factor of Flynn test directs courts
to determine whether person who prepared soft information possessed sufficient expertise to
develop factual basis for soft information).
88. See Note, supra note 87, at 930-31 (stating that documents that corporations prepare
for purpose of encouraging purchase of corporate securities or assets tend to present optimistic
image of corporation); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text (setting forth Flynn test).
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information is unreliable or biased, the factual basis cannot aid investors
in determining whether reliance on soft information is justifiable.8 9 By
conditioning reliability of soft information upon reliability of the underlying
factual basis, the Flynn test for materiality acknowledges that a reliable
factual basis provides investors with the means to evaluate whether soft
information is reliable 0 Furthermore, the Flynn test accomodates recent
changes in SEC regulations that indicate that financial projections are not
misleading by nature.9'
If the Fourth Circuit in Walker had chosen to apply the Flynn test to
Action's financial projections, the Fourth Circuit might have found that
the financial projections were reliable.9 2 Because Action prepared the finan-
cial projections for its own use, the financial projections probably did not
reflect bias. 93 Because Action based the financial projections on actual
orders, the financial projections had a relatively objective basis in fact.
94
Although the orders did not represent guaranteed future sales, Action had
classified the orders according to the likelihood that customers might cancel
the orders. 95 If Action had disclosed the degree to which the projections
represented firm orders, investors could have gauged the reliability of the
projections accordingly.
96
By evaluating the reliability of Action's financial projections on the
criterion of certainty alone, the Walker court assumed that investors cannot
comprehend probabilistic information. 97 Other circuit courts reach conflict-
89. See Note, supra note 87, at 928-31 (discussing application of Flynn test).
90. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring
courts to examine facts and assumptions underlying soft information); Note, supra note 87,
at 930 (stating that under Flynn test, shareholders may determine whether underlying assump-
tions were reliable).
91. See Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988 (stating that Flynn test fully will effectuate changes in
SEC regulations affecting disclosure); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1987) (limiting corporate
liability for disclosing financial projections); Proposed Safe-Harbor Rule for Projections,
Securities Act Release No. 5993, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,757 (Nov. 7, 1978) (stating that proposed safe harbor rule would deem projections of
revenue, income, or earnings per share not to be misleading if projections have reasonable
basis and corporation discloses projections in good faith). The SEC stated in rule 175 that
forward-looking statements made in good faith on a reasonable basis are not fraudulent. 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (1987). In regulation S-K, which sets forth disclosure requirements for
corporations registering stock offerings, the SEC encourages corporations to disclose in an
appropriate format projections that have a reasonable basis. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1987).
92. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (speculating on possible determination
of reliability under factors of Flynn test).
93. See supra note 16 (discussing Action's internal financial reports); see also supra notes
89-90 and accompanying text (discussing application of bias factor of Flynn test).
94. See supra note 16 (discussing factual basis from which Action prepared financial
projections); see also supra notes 87 & 89 and accompanying text (discussing application of
factor of Flynn that evaluates facts and assumptions underlying soft information).
95. See supra note 16 (discussing Action's internal financial reports).
96. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that disclosure of factual basis
reduces likelihood that soft information will mislead investors).
97. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of courts that hold
uncertain information inherently to be misleading).
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ing conclusions, however, as to whether uncertain information is inherently
misleading.98 Because the Walker analysis of reliability examines the financial
projections as isolated figures, the Walker analysis fails to effectuate recent
changes in SEC regulations which recognize that if properly disclosed,
financial projections are not misleading. 99 By refusing to consider probabi-
listic information significant, the Walker court permits tender offerors to
deprive investors of information that is not necessarily misleading.100
ANDRxw MiLNE
98. See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (discussing rulings of Sixth, Seventh,
and Third Circuits concerning reliability of soft information).
99. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Walker court's choice not to
give effect to transitions in SEC regulations); see also supra note 91 (describing recent changes
in SEC rules on financial projections).
100. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate disclosure of soft
information); see also supra text accompanying notes 92-96 (discussing possibility that Action's
financial projections were not misleading under Flynn test).
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B. Limiting the Scope of Civil RICO: International Data Bank,
Ltd. v. Zepkin
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970' regulates many aspects of
organized crime.2 Congress enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act, the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),3 to
stop organized crime from infiltrating legitimate enterprises operating in
interstate commerce.4 RICO prohibits any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from partici-
pating in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 5 RICO defines the term "racketeering activity" to
include offenses most often associated with organized crime's infiltration of
legitimate enterprises. 6 To satisfy the pattern requirement, RICO requires a
minimum of two racketeering acts. 7 One of the offenses that RICO targets
is any federal offense involving fraud in the sale of securities.' RICO
authorizes persons injured through a violation of RICO to seek civil
remedies, including treble damages. 9 In International Data Bank, Ltd. v.
Zepkin'O the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered, first, whether the plaintiff corporation had standing to maintain a
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. Id. In enacting the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress addressed syndicated
gambling and racketeer-influenced organizations. Id. To curb racketeering activity, Congress
authorized new enforcement procedures including special grand juries, protective housing for
government witnesses, and special offender sentencing. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4. 4. See S. Rap. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) (discussing menace of
organized crime and expectations of drafters of RICO). In enacting RICO, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary expressed concern over the increasing penetration of organized
crime into commercial enterprises. Id. Congress, the President, and the Attorney General had
suggested that the traditional approaches of fine and imprisonment were falling to halt the
growth of organized crime. Id. at 78-79. By enacting RICO, Congress sought to unseat the
leaders of organized crime through enhanced criminal sanctions and to attack the economic
base of organized crime through new civil remedies, including a suit for treble damages. Id.
at 81.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). RICO defines the term "racketeering
activity" to include any act or threat involving such crimes as bribery, extortion, narcotics
and drug trafficking, securities fraud, and violation of specifically enumerated sections of the
United States Code. Id.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (requiring two acts of racketeering activity to bring claim
under § 1962 (a)-(c) of RICO). In RICO, Congress included the pattern requirement to reserve
the sweeping remedies of RICO for crimes more extensive than one isolated act of racketeering
activity. See S. RaP. No. 617, supra note 4, at 158 (explaining purpose of RICO's pattern
requirement).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
10. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
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civil RICO action for securities fraud and, second, whether the plaintiff
alleged sufficient acts of racketeering activity to satisfy RICO's pattern
requirement."
In Zepkin the defendants, Eugene Zepkin and Harold Grossman, issued
a stock prospectus for a new firm, International Data Bank, Ltd. (IDB).12
The prospectus claimed that Zepkin and Grossman advanced, through their
partnership, BIC, Ltd., and their corporation, Southern Investment Cor-
poration, 116,685 dollars in start-up costs and equipment to IDB.'3 The
prospectus stated, further, that IDB eventually would repay Zepkin and
Grossman for the cash and equipment advances.' 4 In response to the
prospectus, Zepkin and Grossman obtained five hundred thousand dollars
from ten outside investors." IDB eventually repaid the funds that Zepkin
and Grossman claimed to have advanced.' 6 The ten outside investors sub-
sequently ousted Zepkin and Grossman and took control of IDB. 7
After the outside investors gained control of IDB, IDB filed a civil
RICO action against Zepkin and Grossman in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 8 IDB alleged that by placing
fraudulent statements in the prospectus, the defendants violated SEC rule
lOb-5' 9, which prohibits fraud in the securities market.20 The district court
11. See International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that IDB lacked standing to sue under RICO and failed to allege pattern of racketeering
activity).
12. Id. at 150; see Brief for Appellant at 5-7, International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin,
812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-2052) [hereinafter Appellant's BrieA] (discussing events
that led to fraud on IDB by Zepkin and Grossman). In Zepkin, Zepkin and Grossman were
founders 'and organizers of International Data Bank, Ltd. and members of the corporation's
initial Board of Directors and Executive Committee. Id. at 5. Zepkin and Grossman began to
promote and organize IDB in the spring of 1983. Id. To promote IDB, Zepkin and Grossman
sought subscribers to make an aggregate initial capital investment of $600,000.00. Id. Zepkin
and Grossman ultimately found ten other investors Id. Each investor in IDB purchased two
shares of IDB stock. Id.
13. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 150.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing contributions that enabled
Zepkin and Grossman to raise initial $600,000.00).
16. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 150; see Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing
corporation's repayment of Zepkin and Grossman). In Zepkin, Zepkin and Grossman attached
to the prospectus a detailed refund invoice that referred to pages in the prospectus listing the
equipment purchased with the money that Zepkin and Grossman claimed to have advanced.
Id. at 6-7. Subsequently, IDB fully paid the invoice. Id. at 7.
17. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 150.
18. Id.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
20. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 151. In Zepkin, IDB claimed that Zepkin and Grossman violated
rule lOb-5. Id. at 150-51. Rule 101-5 is a general antifraud provision intended to protect
investors and the integrity of the securities market. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5
prohibits persons from employing manipulative or deceptive practices in the securities market.
Id. IDB alleged that Zepkin and Grossman falsified in the prospectus the amount that Zepkin
and Grossman actually advanced to IDB. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 150. IDB alleged that Zepkin
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dismissed the suit because IDB had neither bought nor sold any securities
and, therefore, lacked standing to bring a RICO claim based on securities
fraud.2' IDB unsuccessfully appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.22 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that IDB lacked standing and held, further, that IDB failed to
allege a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO.23
In affirming the district court's dismissal of IDB's claim, the Fourth
Circuit in Zepkin did not question that IDB had suffered injury resulting
from the actions of Zepkin and Grossman. 24 The Fourth Circuit held,
however, that because IDB based its RICO claim on a rule lOb-5 predicate
offense, the district court properly applied the rule lOb-5 standing require-
ment that allows only purchasers and sellers of securities to sue privately
for damages.? The Fourth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent that
only actual purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to bring a
private action for a rule lOb-5 violation.26 The Fourth Circuit found,
and Grossman sought reimbursement for equipment never purchased or for used equipment
purchased, but claimed as new equipment. Id. According to IDB, Zepkin and Grossman
fraudulently claimed to have advanced at least $75,000.00 more than Zepkin and Grossman
actually advanced. Id. at 150-51. IDB sought treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to
section 1964(c) of RICO. Id. at 150.
21. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 151 (district court noting that IDB failed to allege that rule
lOb-5 violations occurred during purchase or sale of securities).
22. Id. at 155.
23. See id. at 154-55 (citing RICO pattern requirement as additional support for district
court's dismissal of RICO claim). In Zepkin, the Fourth Circuit noted that the racketeering
acts that RICO requires plaintiffs to allege are commonly termed "predicate acts," Id. at 151;
see supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing RICO requirement that plaintiffs allege at
least two acts of racketeering activity).
24. See id. at 151 (suggesting that IDB may have common law claim based on fraud,
breach of contract, or some other cause of action for recovery of improper reimbursement).
25. See id. at 154 (holding that district court applied proper standing requirement).
26. Id. at 151; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)
(limiting standing to sue under rule lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities). In Blue Chip
Stamps an antitrust decree required the defendant corporation to offer a substantial number
of common stock shares to various retailers, including the plaintiff. Id. at 726. Alleging that
the defendant and others devised a scheme to discourage offerees under the antitrust decree
from purchasing the defendant's securities, the plaintiff brought a class action for damages
pursuant to rule lob-5. Id. The plaintiff claimed that to discourage offerees under the antitrust
decree from purchasing the securities and to allow the defendant eventually to sell the securities
to the public for a higher price, the defendant published materially misleading statements
expressing an overly pessimistic view of the defendant's business. Id. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Manor Drug Stores
v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The plaintiff, however, successfully
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1973). After the Ninth Circuit's reversal,
however, the defendant successfully appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Blue Chip
Stamps, 723 U.S. at 755. On appeal the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that
only actual purchasers and sellers of securities could bring a private action for damages under
rule lOb-5. Id.
In holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:767
therefore, that because IDB's injury did not result from the purchase or
sale of securities, IDB suffered no injury cognizable under rule lOb-5. 27
In holding that the district court 'properly applied the standing require-
ment of rule lOb-5 to IDB's RICO claim, the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin
considered whether Congress intended the purchaser-seller restriction of rule
lOb-5 to apply to a RICO claim based on rule lOb-5 violations.2 Noting
that Congress provided no specific guidance, the Fourth Circuit advanced
three theories that support limiting RICO claims based on rule lOb-5
violations to purchasers and sellers of securities. 29 The Fourth Circuit noted,
first, that because the scope of RICO's language prohibiting fraud in the
sale of securities is narrow, the actual sales transaction plays a pivotal role
in the RICO violation.3 0 The Fourth Circuit noted, second, that federal
courts consistently have recognized that only purchasers and sellers of
in Blue Chip Stamps relied on Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. Id. at 730; see Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that rule 10b-5 protects
only defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In
Birnbaum the plaintiffs were shareholders of Newport Steel Corporation (Newport Steel).
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462. The plaintiffs brought a suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York against Newport Steel, C. Russell Feldmann, the
corporation's majority shareholder, president, and board chairman, and each of the individual
directors. Id. The plaintiffs alleged violations of rule lOb-5. Id. The plaintiffs charged that
Feldmann and the Newport Steel directors wrongfully rejected an offer to merge with another
steel company and, instead, sold the plaintiffs' shares in Newport Steel to a third company
for huge personal profit, but to the detriment of the Newport Steel shareholders. Id. The
district court held that rule lob-5 applied only to purchasers and sellers of securities and
dismissed the rule lOb-5 action. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506, 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). The plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 464. On appeal the Second Circuit agreed with
the district court that rule lOb-5 applies only to purchasers and sellers of securities. Id at 463-
64; see Gurley v. Documation Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying restriction
of rule lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities to dismiss plaintiff who claimed that
corporation wrongfully and fraudulently denied plaintiff opportunity to sell shares in corpo-
ration).
27. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 151.
28. Id. at 152.
29. See id. (noting lack of specific legislative guidance on standing issue); see also infra
notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing theories advanced by Fourth Circuit that favor
rule lOb-5 standing requirement instead of IDB's broader suggestion).
30. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152. In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit contrasted Congress'
prohibition of fraud in the sale of securities in section 1961(l)(D) of RICO with the broader
language of rule lOb-5, which prohibits fraud connected with the purchase or sale of a security.
Id. Noting also the broad prohibition in section 1961(l)(D) of any fraud connected with a
case under Title 11 of the United States Code, the Fourth Circuit suggested that if Congress
had intended to extend a cause of action to persons who neither purchased nor sold securities,
Congress would have used broader language. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that
Congress intended for RICO to apply only to fraud connected with an actual sales transaction.
Id. See generally MacIntosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful
New Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 KAN. L. Rav. 7, 35-36 (1982) (noting that
courts strictly could interpret § 1961 (1)(D) of RICO to exclude even purchasers of securities).
MacIntosh suggests that courts should require RICO plaintiffs to satisfy, at a minimum, the
standing requirement of the predicate offense. Id. at 37.
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securities may bring a private action under rule lOb-5.31 The Fourth Circuit
suggested that if Congress had intended for RICO drastically to change
securities law, Congress explicitly would have altered the traditional rule
lOb-5 standing requirement. 32 The Fourth Circuit explained, finally, that
the rationale that allows only purchasers and sellers of securities to bring
claims under rule lOb-5 also should limit RICO claims based on securities
fraud actions to purchasers and sellers of securities. 3 The Fourth Circuit
recognized, for example, that the presence of a treble damages provision in
section 1964(c) of RICO increases the danger that unscrupulous plaintiffs
will file RICO suits solely to disrupt legitimate businesses and coerce
undeserved settlements. 34 The Fourth Circuit decided, therefore, to require
plaintiffs in civil RICO actions based on securities fraud to be either
purchasers or sellers of securities.
35
In dismissing IDB's suit, the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin relied on a
second, independent rationale that the district court did not address.3 6 The
Fourth Circuit ruled that IDB had failed to allege a pattern of racketeering
activity as required by section 1962 of RICO. 37 The Zepkin court observed
that under section 1961(5) of RICO, a pattern of racketeering activity
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity.3 8 The Fourth Circuit
31. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152 (noting that courts almost unanimously limit standing
to sue under rule lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities). In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit
noted that federal courts frequently have recognized the rule of the Birnbaum court, which
limits standing under rule 10b-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities. Id; see supra note 26
and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's holding in Birnbaum); see also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (recognizing continuing validity of
Birnbaum).
32. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152-53 (suggesting that Congress intended RICO simply to
expand range of remedies available to defrauded securities plaintiffs, rather than to overturn
rule lOb-5 standing requirement).
33. See id. (applying rationale for rule lOb-5 standing requirement to RICO cases based
on securities fraud); infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for limiting
RICO actions based on securities fraud to purchasers and sellers of securities); see also Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-49 (1975) (suggesting policy support
for limiting field of potential rule lOb-5 plaintiffs).
34. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 153 (noting that Blue Chip Stamps Court sought to avoid
nuisance suits and coerced settlements). In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit recognized, additionally,
that if courts abandon the rule 10b-5 standing requirement, RICO plaintiffs likely will file
suits based on highly speculative testimony concerning what would have happened if the RICO
plaintiffs had bought or sold certain securities. Id. Both the Supreme Court in Blue Chip and
the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin feared that in the absence of the Blue Chip standing requirement,
bystanders to the securities market passively could observe developments and, then, blame
inaccurate disclosures whenever a decision not to buy or sell proved to be unprofitable. Id;
see Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975) (noting unreliable character of evidence on
which plaintiffs who neither bought nor sold securities would rely).
35. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154.
36. See id. (suggesting that IDB's claim would fail even if IDB had proper standing).
37. See id. (ruling that fraudulent acts alleged by IDB constituted single, limited scheme
of criminal activity); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) (requiring RICO plaintiffs to
allege pattern of illegal conduct).
38. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154. Section 1961(5) of RICO provides that a pattern of
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recognized, however, that although two acts of racketeering activity are
necessary to form a RICO pattern, a RICO plaintiff must allege at least
two predicate acts that are related and demonstrate a continuous criminal
endeavor. 39 The Fourth Circuit noted that courts have applied various tests
to determine whether a plaintiff has alleged a pattern of racketeering
activity.40 Refusing to accept any mechanical test, however, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that a court should examine the particular facts of each
individual case to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged predicate acts
of sufficient gravity and persistence to constitute a RICO pattern.4' The
Fourth Circuit found, consequently, that IDB had alleged predicate acts
that were related, but had failed to demonstrate a continuous pattern of
criminal activity. 42 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that although
ntmerous investors received the fraudulent prospectus distributed by Zepkin
and Grossman, the distribution of the prospectus constituted a single scheme
of racketeering activity.4 3 The Fourth Circuit held, accordingly, that although
IDB alleged multiple violations of rule 10b-5, the alleged violations consti-
tuted a single fraudulent scheme and, therefore, did not satisfy section
1961(5) of RICO. 44
racketeering activity requires at least two racketeering acts, one of which occurred after the
effective date of RICO and the last of which occurred within ten years of a previous racketeering
act, not including any period of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); see Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (discussing definition of term "pattern"
under RICO). In Sedima the Supreme Court observed that although the language of RICO
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity to constitute a pattern, RICO does not define
a pattern as two acts. Id. The Court observed, therefore, that in some cases, a plaintiff must
plead more than two racketeering acts to plead a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
39. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154; see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
n.14. (1985) (noting that two isolated racketeering acts fail to constitute RICO pattern). In
Sedima the Supreme Court analyzed RICO's legislative history to formulate a definition of
the term "pattern of racketeering activity". Id. The Sedima Court noted that Congress did
not intend for RICO to target sporadic criminal activity, but rather the type of continuing
activity that presented a threat to legitimate business. Id. According to legislative history, a
pattern of racketeering activity requires both continuity and relationship. Id.; see S. REP. No.
617, supra note 4, at 158 (explaining that Congress intended to regulate continuing and related
criminal activity).
40. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155 (noting that in interpreting RICO, courts have not
settled on single definition of term "pattern of racketeering activity"); infra notes 67-75 and
accompanying text (discussing various tests applied by courts to determine when plaintiff
alleges pattern of racketeering activity).
41. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155 (suggesting proper method for judging existence of
pattern of racketeering activity); infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's approach to defining RICO pattern requirement).
42. Zepkin 812 F.2d at 154.
43. See id. (holding that conduct of Zepkin and Grossman failed to demonstrate
continuity required for RICO pattern).
44. See id. (holding that IDB's claim was insufficient to establish pattern of racketeering
activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (requiring that RICO plaintiffs satisfy pattern requirement).
In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit suggested that plaintiffs should seek remedies under state and
common law for fraud claims that do not reach the level of continuing criminal activity that
Congress intended to curtail through RICO. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155 (suggesting that
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By both limiting standing to bring a RICO suit based on predicate acts
of securities fraud and requiring a pattern of racketeering activity, the
Fourth Circuit in Zepkin promoted a policy of restricting the use of civil
RICO in securities fraud cases. 45 Many other courts recently have attempted
to focus civil RICO to target only genuine racketeering activity. 46 Although
Congress enacted RICO to halt the infiltration of organized crime into
legitimate businesses, most civil RICO cases have involved allegations of
securities fraud and common-law fraud in a commercial setting, rather than
allegations of criminal activities typically associated with organized crime. 47
Instead of pursuing other civil remedies, plaintiffs able to allege two acts
of securities, wire, or mail fraud occurring within ten years have filed RICO
claims because of the freedom under RICO from the strict limitations of
securities laws and the potential recovery of treble damages. 48 Courts,
claims of ordinary fraud fall under state and common law remedies); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co. 473 U.S. 479, 501-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating greater limitations
on availability of civil RICO cause of action). In Sedima Justice Marshall objected to the
expanding use of civil RICO to provide a remedy for traditional common-law fraud. Id. at
501. Justice Marshall believed that if courts allowed plaintiffs who allege only limited instances
of common-law wire or securities fraud to sue for treble damages and attorney's fees under
RICO, courts would upset carefully developed and settled areas of state and federal law. Id.
at 505-08.
45. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155 (explaining that if Fourth Circuit allowed IDB's claim,
Fourth Circuit would undermine Congress' intent that RICO target only ongoing, persistent,
unlawful activity); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating
stricter limitations on plaintiffs bringing securities fraud actions under RICO). See generally
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO
Task Force 280-82 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Report] (suggesting ways to narrow scope of civil
RICO).
46. See, e.g., Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir.
1987) (suggesting that RICO plaintiffs must allege pattern of racketeering acts and ongoing
criminal enterprise); Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring RICO
plaintiffs to allege multiple acts and threat of ongoing criminal activity); Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring RICO plaintiffs to allege multiple criminal
acts and at least two distinct criminal schemes); Fleet Management Sys., Inc. v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550, 559 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (requiring RICO plaintiffs to
allege minimum of two related criminal episodes); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v.
Inryco Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (holding that RICO plaintiffs must allege
continuous criminal activity and multiple criminal acts).
47. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 4, at 76 (indicating fundamental aim of RICO
legislation was to protect legitimate businesses from organized crime). The Senate Report on
RICO stated that Congress intended RICO to halt organized crime and racketeering from
infiltrating legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce. Id. see ABA Report,
supra note 45, at 55-58 (discussing allegations typically involved in civil RICO claims). The
Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA reported in 1985 that of the 270 known civil
RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% of the cases involved securities fraud, 37% of the
cases common law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% of the cases
involved allegations of the types of criminal activity ordinarily associated with professional
criminals. Id. at 55-56.
48. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing features of civil
RICO that have encouraged plaintiffs to use RICO as alternative to state and federal common-
law causes of action).
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however, have objected to an expansive use of civil RICO for two primary
reasons. 49 First, the extensive use of civil RICO in the area of securities
fraud circumvents well-settled state and federal remedies for ordinary fraud
claims.5 0 Second, expansive use of civil RICO allows plaintiffs to use the
racketeering label and the threat of treble damages to coerce undeserved
settlements from legitimate businesses.
51
Although promoting a common policy of restricting the use of civil
RICO in securities fraud cases, the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin uniquely
restricted the use of civil RICO by rejecting a claim based on securities
fraud for lack of standing.5 2 No previous court had dismissed a civil RICO
action based on securities fraud because the plaintiff lacked standing under
rule lOb-5.13 The Fourth Circuit in Zepkin, however, properly relied on
statutory construction of RICO and the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 4 and required that
the RICO plaintiff in Zepkin be a purchaser or a seller of securities. 55 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that because the Supreme Court held in Blue
Chip Stamps that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to
bring a private action under rule lOb-5, the conduct of Zepkin and Gross-
man, although allegedly fraudulent, would not be actionable under rule
lOb-. 5 6 The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized, therefore, that by allowing
49. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for objecting to
unfettered use of civil RICO in area of securities fraud).
50. See Fleet Management Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F.Supp. 550,
560 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (noting that by restricting use of civil RICO, courts preserve traditional
balance between state and federal claims). In Fleet the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois narrowly interpreted RICO's pattern requirement to preclude RICO
from displacing state common-law claims or elevating ordinary commercial disputes into
racketeering cases. Id.
51. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (noting that plaintiffs
have filed meritless RICO claims against many respected businesses); International Data Bank,
Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting danger that plaintiffs will use RICO
as weapon to disrupt honest businesses). See generally Gurley v. Documation, Inc. 674 F.2d
253, 257 (4th Cir. 1982) (discussing danger of abusive litigation if courts allow plaintiffs
alleging ordinary commercial fraud freely to sue under securities laws).
52. See International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that IDB lacked standing to bring civil RICO claim). Other courts have relied solely
on RICO's pattern requirement to restrict the use of RICO. See infra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (discussing how courts narrowly have interpreted pattern requirement).
53. See Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F.Supp. 667, 683 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (dismissing
RICO claim based on violations of rule lOb-5 for reasons other than lack of standing).
54. 421 U.S. 743 (1975).
55. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152-53 (reasoning that standing requirement of rule lob-5
should apply to RICO claims based on securities fraud); supra note 26 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Blue Chip Stamps).
56. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 151-52. In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit observed that IDB purchased
none of its own stock and that although IDB sold stock in the initial offering, IDB did not
allege injury because of the sale. Id. at 151. Rather, IDB complained that Zepkin and
Grossman fraudulently induced IDB to repay the advances that Zepkin and Grossman claimed
to have made to IDB. Id. at 151-52. The alleged fraud, therefore, occurred after IDB had
completed the stock offering. Id. at 152. The Fourth Circuit reasoned, thus, that IDB brought
a claim as neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities. Id.
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IDB to bring a civil RICO action based upon a rule lOb-5 predicate offense,
the Fourth Circuit would enable IDB to use RICO to circumvent the rule
lOb-5 standing requirement. 57 The Fourth Circuit correctly observed, also,
that if Congress had intended for RICO to overturn settled law, Congress
explicitly would have altered the rule lOb-5 standing requirement. 58 The
Fourth Circuit noted, however, that section 1961(1)(D) of RICO does not
indicate whether Congress intended courts to apply a standing requirement
different from the standing requirement associated with the underlying
securities law.5 9 Absent a clear expression of a contrary intention, courts
generally should interpret the words of a statute according to the ordinary
meaning of the words.60 Thus, the Fourth Circuit correctly limited the right
to bring a civil RICO action based on a rule lOb-5 violation to purchasers
and sellers of securities.
6'
In addition to narrowly construing the language of RICO, the Fourth
Circuit properly noted that the policy that led the Supreme Court to limit
the right to bring a rule lOb-5 action in Blue Chip Stamps applies with
equal or greater force to civil RICO actions based on allegations of securities
fraud.62 In Blue Chip Stamps the Supreme Court noted that securities
litigation presents a high risk of meritless suits designed to disrupt legitimate
businesses and, consequently, coerce undeserved settlements. 63 The Fourth
57. See id. at 154. (describing necessity of rule lOb-5 standing requirement in securities
law). The Fourth Circuit recently stressed the importance of limiting Rule 10b-5 actions to
purchasers and sellers of securities. See Gurley v. Documation Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 257 (4th
Cir. 1982)(recognizing danger of suits based on weak evidence or designed to harass legitimate
businesses if courts expanded standing under rule lOb-5 beyond purchasers and sellers of
securities).
58. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152-53 (noting drastic implication of ignoring rule lob-5
standing requirement in civil RICO claims).
59. See id. (observing that Congress failed to clarify whether RICO strictly applies to
purchasers and sellers of securities or incorporates standing requirements of other securities
laws).
60. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (holding that when words
of statute are plain and no contrary intention appears, court should enforce language according
to ordinary meaning). See generally, Macintosh, supra note 30, at 36 (suggesting that courts
should conclude that Congress meant other than what Congress said only if plain meaning of
words of statute would generate results wholly inconsistent with underlying purpose of statute).
61. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 153 (restricting RICO claims based on rule lob-5 violations to
purchasers and sellers of securities); see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's holding that only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to bring
civil RICO claims based on violations of Rule lOb-5); see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text (discussing rationale for applying rule lOb-5 standing requirement to civil RICO actions).
62. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 153 (explaining that because Congress has not legislated
standing requirement for civil RICO action, courts should consider practical considerations
addressed in Blue Chip Stamps); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 739-49 (1975) (suggesting that strict standing requirement for rule lOb-5 actions protects
legitimate businesses).
63. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-42 (1975) (discussing
inherent potential for abusive securities litigation). In Blue Chip Stamps the Supreme Court
warned that plaintiffs in securities actions often can disrupt a defendant's normal business
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Circuit correctly noted that RICO's treble damages provision only can
increase the danger of such nuisance suits.64 By limiting the availability of
a cause of action based upon rule 10b-5 and RICO to purchasers and sellers
of securities, however, a court can restrict the use of civil RICO to plaintiffs
who can allege some factual data to support a RICO claim.6 5 The Fourth
Circuit in Zepkin correctly limited civil RICO actions to those securities
claims that Congress intended RICO to remedy.6
In addition to denying IDB standing to bring a RICO claim based on
a rule 10b-5 violation, the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin also recognized that
most courts restrict the use of civil RICO by focusing on the pattern of
racketeering activity requirement.67 Since the Supreme Court recognized in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 6 1 that a pattern of racketeering activity
requires continuity and relationship, federal courts have taken various
positions on what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. 9 One group
of courts, exemplified by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association
v. Touche Ross Co.,70 has held that two or more predicate acts establish a
pattern of racketeering activity, provided that the acts are not isolated.71 A
activity and unjustly use the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
examine the defendant's business documents. Id. at 741. The Supreme Court noted, conse-
quently, that even complaints that obviously show little chance for success at trial have a large
settlement value to unscrupulous plaintiffs. Id. at 740.
64. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 153 (noting increased danger of vexatious securities litigation
under RICO).
65. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 743 (cautioning that if courts allow persons who
neither bought nor sold securities to sue under Rule lOb-5, plaintiffs will force courts to
evaluate claims based on questionable and inexact oral testimony). In Blue Chip Stamps the
Supreme Court noted that by restricting a cause of action under RICO and rule lOb-5 to
purchasers and sellers of securities, courts would increase the possibility of disposing of
meritless suits before the suits inflict damage on legitimate businesses. Id.
66. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 153 (discussing possible consequences of overly large plaintiff
class); supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing risks to legitimate businesses if
courts expand RICO plaintiff beyond parties Congress intended to target).
67. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155; see, e.g., Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 824 (7th
Cir. 1986) (holding that to allege pattern of racketeering activity, RICO plaintiffs must allege
more than series of racketeering acts aimed at defrauding one victim); Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (advocating strict requirements for alleging pattern
of racketeering activity); N. Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831
(N.D. II1. 1985) (holding that pattern of racketeering activity requires ongoing criminal activity
as well as multiple criminal acts).
68. 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing
Sedima).
69. See Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
various ways that courts have interpreted RICO's pattern requirement); see also infra notes
70-76 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to RICO's pattern requirement).
70. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
71. 71. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross Co., 782 F.2d 966,
971 (11th Cir. 1986). In Bank of America the Eleventh Circuit held that multiple acts of mail
and wire fraud aimed at defrauding the same parties constituted a pattern of criminal activity.
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second group of courts, exemplified by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer.,72 has held that
multiple criminal acts related to a single criminal episode or scheme do not
constitute a RICO pattern. 73 According to the Superior Oil interpretation
of the pattern requirement, the plaintiff must allege more than one criminal
scheme to establish a pattern of racketeering activity24 The Fourth Circuit
in Zepkin, however, adopted a position between the two possible extreme
interpretations of the pattern requirement. 75 The Fourth Circuit ruled that
a pattern of racketeering activity requires serious, ongoing criminal activity,
but refused absolutely to require multiple acts or multiple schemes.
76
Nearly every court that has addressed RICO's pattern requirement has
recognized that Congress did not intend RICO to remedy isolated criminal
violations, but rather to target cases in which a threat of continuing criminal
activity exists. 77 Courts have had little difficulty finding the relation element
among the criminal acts that RICO plaintiffs have alleged, because in most
claims plaintiffs have been able to allege numerous clearly related criminal
acts. 7 The continuity element of the Sedima standard, however, has caused
courts confusion.79 In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit noted that if courts allowed
72. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
73. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986).
74. See id. (requiring two independent criminal schemes to allege pattern of racketeering
activity).
75. See International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing
to accept either extreme position on what constitutes RICO pattern).
76. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155.
77. See, e.g., Condict v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that criminal
scheme to achieve single objective fails to threaten ongoing criminal activity); Fleet Management
Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550, 559 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that
RICO pattern requires threat of continuing*criminal activity); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare,
N.A. v. Inryco, Inc. 615 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stressing importance of continuing
activity to RICO concept of pattern). See generally S. REP. No. 617, supra note 4, at 158
(discussing Congress' expectations for individual sections of RICO). The Senate Report on
RICO emphasized the importance to RICO of the pattern requirement. Id. Congress believed
that including single, isolated acts of racketeering activity within the prohibitions of RICO
would place an unmanageable volume of common-law claims in the federal courts. Id. Congress
also believed that the remedies under RICO were too harsh to impose on persons committing
individual acts of racketeering activity. Id.; See ABA Report, supra note 45, at 207-08
(suggesting that RICO's pattern requirement reduces volume of claims). The Ad Hoe Civil
Rico Task Force of the ABA opined that Congress intended the pattern requirement to limit
RICO to cases in which defendants commit racketeering acts in a manner that indicates that
defendants regularly engage in racketeering activity. Id. at 208.
78. See, e.g., Condict v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting relationship
among criminal acts easily demonstrated when alleged acts are part of common, fraudulent
scheme); Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154 (noting that numerous fraudulent statements made by
defendants clearly were related); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-55, 257 (8th
Cir. 1986) (noting that defendants' acts of mail and wire fraud obviously were related).
79. See, e.g. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1987)
(urging that previous Fifth Circuit RICO opinion incorrectly failed to require continuity among
criminal acts constituting RICO pattern); Condict v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir.
1987) (noting that continuity requirement has been source of considerable difficulty for courts);
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plaintiffs to bring RICO claims whenever plaintiffs can allege two related
racketeering acts, courts would allow nearly every fraud claim to fall within
the scope of RICO.80 The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that if courts
held that a pattern of racketeering activity always required two distinct
schemes, courts would risk excluding large, continuous schemes that Con-
gress certainly intended to target with RICO.8 1 In determining that courts
should focus on specific facts that demonstrate criminal dimension and
degree, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan.82 The Morgan
court rejected a requirement of multiple schemes and adopted a fact-oriented
approach that focused on the ongoing nature of the defendants' criminal
activity.8 3 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Zepkin correctly held that courts
should determine on a case specific basis whether RICO defendants' actions
satisfy the RICO pattern requirement.
8 4
In addition to more accurately including the types of criminal activity
that Congress intended for RICO to reach, the Fourth Circuit's interpre-
tation of the pattern requirement reduces the semantical difficulties inherent
in other courts' mechanical tests. s5 Tests applied by other courts have
required the courts to differentiate between criminal acts, criminal episodes,
and criminal schemes.8 6 Courts have had difficulty creating meaningful
distinctions among terms so similar.8 7 The similar terms also invite a clever
Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that courts have employed
variety of formulations for continuity element of RICO pattern).
80. See International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting
that by allowing any two related acts to constitute a pattern, courts effectively would eliminate
RICO's pattern requirement).
81. Id. at 155 (noting that strict requirement of multiple criminal schemes constitutes
unduly narrow interpretation of RICO's pattern requirement); see Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803
F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir 1986) (recognizing that some courts fear strict requirement of multiple
schemes would allow large, continuous schemes to escape enhanced penalties under RICO).
82. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
83. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
84. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155 (suggesting general criteria for evaluating alleged pattern
of racketeering activity).
85. See Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting variety of general
terms that courts have employed in tests for RICO pattern). In Zepkin the Fourth Circuit
avoided using terms such as "criminal act," "criminal scheme," and "criminal episode" to
describe what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. See International Data Bank v.
Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) (declining to define RICO pattern in mechanical
terms).
86. Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that episode
constitutes more than act of racketeering activity, but less than scheme). See generally PLI,
Crvu RICO 1986 370 (P. Chepiga, R. Khuzami, D. Bookin, A. Bridges, eds. 1986) (PLI
Litigation and Administrative Practice Series No. 141) [hereinafter Crvn. RICO] (noting
difficulty that courts have had distinguishing criminal schemes and episodes) . The Practicing
Law Institute suggested that a criminal scheme is a group of individual acts performed to
effect a single criminal objective. Id. A criminal episode, however, is any subset of criminal
acts unified by time place, method or a common criminal scheme. Id.
87. See Petro-Tech Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1356 (3d Cir 1987)
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plaintiff to subdivide the events alleged in the complaint to satisfy whichever
mechanical test that courts in the relevant jurisdiction apply.8 If courts
strictly required plaintiffs to allege multiple schemes to establish continuity,
courts would make the Sedima rule requiring continuity and relationship
nearly impossible for plaintiffs to satisfy because continuity and relationship
necessarily work against each other. 9 The more related a series of predicate
acts are, the more the acts will resemble a common episode or scheme and,
in the view of some courts, fail the continuity requirement.9° A reasonable
alternative to strict relatedness and continuity requirements is for courts to
consider the scope of criminal activity and determine on a case by case
basis whether a pattern of racketeering activity exists. 9' The Fourth Circuit,
thus, attempted in Zepkin to create a sensible working alternative to
unworkably mechanical tests for the existence of a pattern of racketeering
activity.92
In International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin the Fourth Circuit held
that the standing requirement limiting private actions under rule 10b-5 to
purchasers and sellers of securities also applies to plaintiffs bringing civil
RICO actions based upon violations of rule lOb-5. 93 The Fourth Circuit
also advocated a case by case determination of whether a RICO plaintiff
has alleged a pattern of racketeering activity. 94 In both holdings, the Fourth
Circuit voiced concern that plaintiffs potentially would use civil RICO in
securities fraud cases that Congress did not intend to target.95 Both of the
Fourth Circuit's holdings, therefore, place restrictions on the class of
plaintiffs for whom a RICO cause of action is available. 96 By limiting the
(doubting whether courts ever will formulate consistent, workable definitions of terms "scheme,"
"episode," and "activity"); supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing Lipin court's
attempt to distinguish among scheme, episode, and pattern).
88. See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
difficulty of giving effect to theoretical concept of pattern of racketeering activity in practice).
89. Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1355 (3d Cir 1987) (noting
that relatedness requires criminal acts that are close in time and focus while continuity requires
multiple yet unconnected schemes or episodes); Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 (noting that excessive
focus on continuity effectively negates relatedness).
90. See generally Civu. RICO, supra note 86, at 383 (noting that closely related predicate
acts often will resemble common episode and fail continuity requirement).
91. See Morgan, 804 F.2d at 977 (insisting that only fact-oriented standard consistently
can assess relatedness and continuity).
92. See International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
that proper focus of pattern requirement is criminal dimension and degree); see supra notes
85-91 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness of focusing on criminal dimension and
degree in each specific case to determine existence of RICO pattern).
93. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding
that standing to bring civil RICO claim for securities fraud should be available only to
purchasers and sellers of securities).
94. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's refusal to
adopt any mechanical test for determining existence of RICO pattern).
95. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for restricting
class of plaintiffs entitled to sue under RICO).
96. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Fourth Circuit's
holdings on class of securities fraud plaintiffs entitled to sue under RICO).
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plaintiff class, the Fourth Circuit took steps to make RICO a more effective
weapon against racketeering activity and a less likely means for forcing
ordinary commercial fraud claims into federal court.9 7
ROBERT W. PONTZ
97. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text (discussing practical effects of Fourth
Circuit's holdings).
